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Abstract 
Believers tend to view the experience of coincidences as evidence for a variety of paranormal 
beliefs in mind and mysterious causal mechanisms out in the world. On the other hand, 
skeptics (e.g. most psychologists) tend to dismiss the psychological experience of 
coincidences as just yet one more demonstration of how irrational people can be. Irrationality 
in this context means an association between the experience of coincidences and biased 
cognition in terms of poor probabilistic reasoning and a propensity for paranormal beliefs. In 
this article, we present a third way: the rationalist perspective on the psychology of 
coincidence occurrence. We develop this new emphasis, including a new definition of 
coincidence, out of reviewing and synthesizing the extant literature on coincidences. We then 
propose a new three stage model to describe the psychological experience of coincidence, the 
3C’s model: 1. (C)o-incidence detection, 2. (C)ausal mechanism search 3. (C)oincidence 
versus cause judgment.   The core principles in this model are that people use the same 
properties relevant for causal reasoning when detecting and evaluating events that are 
ultimately judged to be coincidental, and we describe how the model can account for the key 
prior research on coincidences. Crucially, rather than just being examples of irrationality, we 
argue that the experience of coincidences is a necessary consequence of rational causal 
learning mechanisms and provides a widely ignored approach to evaluating the mechanisms 
of causal reasoning.             
 
 
Key Words: Coincidences, Pattern repetitions, Contingency learning, Causality, Induction 
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Coincidences: A Fundamental Consequence of Rational Cognition 
1. General approaches to understanding coincidences 
There are two basic views of the psychological experience and occurrence of coincidences 
that are fundamentally at odds with each other: The believer view, prevalent among members 
of the general public, is that coincidences are in fact evidence for various paranormal beliefs, 
held in the mind, and are induced by mysterious/hidden/paranormal causes, operating out in 
the world. The contrasting, skeptic view—prevalent among many scientists, particularly 
psychologists studying coincidences—is that the occurrence of coincidences, as 
psychologically experienced, is induced by noisy, chance occurrences out in the world which 
are then misconstrued via irrational cognitive biases into unfounded, possibly even 
paranormal beliefs in the mind.  
The focus of this article is to argue that there is a third way of conceptualising 
coincidences, that is, from a rationalist perspective that their occurrence in terms of being a 
psychological experience is an inevitable consequence of the mind searching for causal 
structure in reality. We propose that a co-occurrence (as observed by a human) may end up 
being judged to be causal or it may be judged to be coincidental, but either way, both are 
dependent on the same inductive mechanisms. In essence this alternative position suggests 
that the occurrence of coincidences as psychologically experienced is integrally involved 
with a rational conception of the mind. More to the point, coincidences are psychological 
phenomena that occur as a result of how the mind perceives events. Most often, these events 
are perceived as meaningful. That is to say, they have personal direct relevance or 
consequences for us (i.e. meaningful psychologically and/or instrumentally), in both cases the 
events have causal impact because they can effect a change in us psychologically, but also 
can cause behavioral changes should we decided to act on the events. 
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Before we present this alternative perspective of coincidences, it is important to 
emphasize what this perspective is not claiming to do. It is not claiming to describe a third 
type of ontological causal mechanism operating out in the world that is in some way distinct 
from the normal causal mechanisms believed to operate in the world by most everyone and 
the paranormal causal mechanisms believed to operate by some. Rather it is intended to be a 
psychological theory describing the experience of coincidences and the resultant reasoning 
about them as they occur in mind.  So when we make reference to “coincidence occurrence” 
or “coincidences” this should be generally taken to mean the experience of coincidence in the 
mind, thus emphasizing the psychological perspective. 
To make the case for this alternative conceptualisation, in this article we review two 
aspects of psychological research on coincidences, the definitions, and the empirical studies 
of the phenomena. We evaluate the current research from the rationalist conceptualisation by 
proposing a new definition and theoretical framework. In addition, not only do we want to 
propose that coincidences reflect rational cognition, we claim that the psychology behind 
coincidences is another route to better understanding causal induction and the underlying 
coincidence detection mechanisms it is based on. 
1.1 Coincidences: An Illustration 
To start with an example, consider the real case of identical twins separated at birth and 
living in different states in the US (Burger & Starbird, 2005). After being reunited 40 
years later, the brothers shared a surprising number of attributes. Along with identical 
facial appearances (e.g., eye colour, hair colour), they drove the same make of car, chain-
smoked the same brand of cigarettes, and preferred the same type of light beer. They both 
also remarried, and both initially married a Linda before then marrying a Betty. They also 
found out that they were audience members on the same night of the Tonight Show 
Starring Johnny Carson. 
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This example has many of the key aspects we develop into a new definition and 
theoretical framework for coincidences below in terms of the mechanisms for inferring 
causality. Some of the attributes shared by the twins can plausibly be explained as just 
chance regularities—for example if they drove a car manufacturer by Ford, smoked 
Marlboros, and drank Budweiser—especially as such individual attributes are common in 
the US population. Also divorce rates are high and the names of the women that they 
married are common, so chance can clearly explain individual shared attributes, though 
the overall combination of the attributions is still quite surprising. While admittedly the 
attributes listed here do not include the many features they did not share, the conjunction 
of many moderately probable features that they do share still seems relatively unlikely by 
chance and surprising, inviting causal explanation. Some kind of paranormal twin 
connectedness through psychic links is one possible causal mechanism, which could 
easily be contested (Blackmore, 1992). Shared genes are a more plausible causal 
explanation for some of the shared attributes, but it is difficult to extend this explanation 
to shared preferences for the same light entertainment show that they attended on the 
same night. This surprising coincidence is troubling in part because of its real world 
messiness in that the relative uniqueness of the events makes the assessment of the overall 
probabilities quite unclear at least in terms objective event frequencies. Also it seems 
likely that while these events are surprising to us, they are nowhere near as surprising and 
meaningful as they likely were to the brothers! In summary: on the one hand, the events 
seem quite unlikely just by chance, making “it’s just chance” quite unsatisfactory, but this 
still seems a preferred explanation given that the available causal mechanisms do not 
fully or compellingly explain all the shared details. 
The point to take from this illustration is that the process by which the mind detects 
pattern repetitions, and the way in which it evaluates them (i.e. cause or coincidence) is 
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based on processes that are used to detect and infer causality; a view currently shared by 
very few (but see Dessalles, 2008; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007). The key point here and 
developed at length in this article is that coincidences need not be characterized only as 
evidence for biased probabilistic reasoning or paranormal belief, which is a common view 
taken by many researchers studying coincidences. The proposed rationalist 
conceptualizing that is presented here is that coincidences provide insights into studying 
the mind’s induction mechanisms, i.e. contingency learning and causal reasoning. 
1.2 Purpose and Plan 
The purpose then of this article is to establish this alternative conceptualization of 
coincidences. To begin with, we situate the rationalist conceptualization within extant 
definitions of coincidences and use them to derive a new definition. We then review research 
on coincidences by organizing this section around empirical work examining psychological 
processes associated with coincidental experiences. We discuss how our conceptualization 
emphasizes some limitations in current research on coincidences, which then provides the 
platform for proposing our 3 C’s Framework of Coincidences—1. Co-incidence detection, 2. 
Causality search and 3. Coincidence versus cause judgment. The framework is designed to 
provide an understanding of the process of detection and interpretation of coincidental events. 
In essence, we build on our conceptualisation in order to argue that while coincidental events 
do not have an underlying causal mechanism that jointly brings them about, they share 
similar properties to those used to detect actual causal mechanisms—temporal and spatial 
proximity, similarity, statistical regularity, and so forth—and so we suggest fruitful directions 
for future research. It is for this reason that understanding the basis by which people 
discriminate between coincidence and cause can help clarify the important properties of 
causal learning.  
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2. Definitions of Coincidences 
We start by introducing the various prior definitions of coincidence as a motivation 
for a definition from the third way, rationalist perspective. Also, the kind of descriptions that 
theorists have used to refer to coincidences broadly reflects the ways in which coincidences 
have been studied, and so this provides a context for the literature which we review in the 
next section.  
2.1 Definitions Emphasizing Low Probabilities  
Some researchers have refrained from giving definitions of coincidences outside of 
referring to the laws of probability. The reason for this is that coincidences are classified as 
chance events and nothing more; so coincidences don’t need additional psychological 
description. John Venn’s (1866) The Logic of Chance exemplifies this point by suggesting 
that laws of probability are enough to explain away coincidental events, “...there can be no 
doubt that, however unlikely an event may be, if we (loosely speaking) vary the 
circumstances sufficiently, or if in other words, we keep on trying hard enough, we shall meet 
with such an event at last” (p. 274). By associating coincidences with unambiguous, low 
probabilities (e.g., double lottery winners, common birthdates, etc.), a bench mark is 
established by which people’s reasoning about coincidences can be compared.  
2.2 Definitions Emphasizing Connected Mental States 
The similarity between this set of definitions and the previous set is that coincidences 
are low probability events which have no causal basis. For example, Henry (1993) proposes 
that “A coincidence experience may be defined as the occurrence of two (or more) odd, 
surprising, out-of-the-ordinary or personally meaningful events connected in the mind of the 
observer” (p. 97). The main difference between the two sets of definitions is that researchers 
in this camp don’t tend to use examples of highly stylized forms of coincidences with 
unambiguously specified probabilities (e.g., lotteries, shared birthdates) in their studies. 
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Instead they focus on people’s actual reported experiences of coincidences in order to 
generate definitions (Coleman & Beitman, 2009; Henry, 1993; Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989).  
2.3 Definitions Emphasizing Causal Phenomena 
Where this set of definitions departs from the previous, is that they focus on the link 
between coincidence and causality (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Johnson, 1898; Mill, 
1843). For instance, take Mill’s (1843) description “The question is not whether the 
coincidence occurs often or seldom, but whether it occurs more often than chance will 
account for” (p. 314). This early description has been revived by Griffiths and Tenenbaum 
(2007). They argue that, “Coincidences arise when there is a conflict between the evidence an 
event provides for a theory and our prior beliefs about the plausibility of that theory. More 
precisely, a coincidence is an event that provides support for an alternative [possibly 
paranormal] to a current theory, but not enough support to convince us to accept that 
alternative” (p. 10).  They go on to formalize this in a Bayesian probabilities framework of 
belief updating for hypotheses which we have used in part to develop our 3C’s framework for 
coincidence (though there are also some key differences which we discuss in detail later). In 
brief, the Bayesian framework proposes that a given set of events might have a greater 
likelihood of their occurrence due to a potentially paranormal hypothesis compared to chance 
(as formalized in a likelihood ratio of the probabilities of the data due to the paranormal 
hypothesis and chance respectively). Note that unlike the skeptic view of coincidences we’ve 
characterized, this represents a genuine admission that the evidence in isolation (that is the 
likelihood ratio by itself) might reasonably constitute some evidence for a paranormal 
hypothesis. However, when this likelihood ratio is combined with prior beliefs against the 
paranormal hypothesis (as formalized in a priors ratio composed of the probability that the 
paranormal hypothesis is true divided by the probability that the chance hypothesis is true), 
these effectively cancel each other out resulting in an ambiguous posterior beliefs ratio in 
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which the probability of neither the causal/paranormal hypothesis nor chance hypothesis is 
substantially larger than the other. Overall, these definitions refer to an evaluation process 
that weighs up the events in terms of evidence based on probability judgments for and against 
chance and causality (an idea we’ll come back to when proposing the 3C’s model below).  
2.4 Definitions Emphasizing Pattern Repetitions 
The previous set of definitions is limited in one respect, which is that they don’t 
consider the particular properties of the events themselves. Stephen Jay Gould (1988) hints at 
the significant impact that pattern detection has on psychology: “We think we see 
constellation[s] because the stars are dispersed at random in the heavens, and therefore clump 
in our sight. Our error lies not in the perception of pattern but in automatically imbuing 
pattern with meaning, especially with meaning that can bring us comfort, or dispel 
confusion” (p. 10). Not only is the detection of a pattern important in experiencing 
coincidences, it is the repetition of the pattern which is the key. That is to say, features of an 
event are subjectively judged to be relevant or salient to the observer, and a subsequent event 
containing features that are also judged to be subjectively similar to the first would constitute 
a coincidence (Santini & Jain, 1999).  
Our own definition of coincidences builds on the previous descriptions that we have 
introduced here. The key details of past definitions that we consider to be important in the 
psychological processes associated with detecting and forming judgments about coincidences 
are: the repetition of two or more similar events/patterns, the likelihood of their co-
occurrence by chance, and the co-occurrence likelihood as the output of a search for causal 
hypotheses. Thus we propose that coincidences are surprising pattern repetitions that are 
observed to be unlikely by chance but are nonetheless ascribed to chance since the search for 
causal mechanisms has not produced anything more plausible than mere chance.  
2.2. What is Not a Coincidence? 
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The reader may rightly point out that there are many events that would fall under our 
definition, and so to clarify this conceptualization we also discuss examples that would not fit 
this definition. Coincidences tend to be surprising (Falk & MacGregor, 1983), but surprising 
events are not necessarily experienced as coincidental (e.g., an unexpected bang from a 
firecracker may induce surprise but not require further consideration about its cause). 
Coincidences are also fairly rare events, but rare events need not be coincidental (Griffiths & 
Tenenbaum, 2007). For example, pouring a jar of coins on the floor will produce a set of 
heads and tails with an extremely low probability, but the configuration of the coins won’t 
induce perception of a coincidence unless there is an obvious surprising pattern repetition 
(e.g., all the coins being heads). Coincidences can be strongly tied to precise, if implausible, 
causal mechanisms (e.g., psychic link between twins), but often coincidences do not invoke 
any specific candidate causes. In fact, many of the examples of coincidences that we discuss 
later are complex and don’t have obvious parapsychological causes. 
So, given these points, let’s now consider the example of shattering a plate in the 
kitchen and shortly thereafter hearing a loud bang from outside, and consider under what 
circumstances this would be a coincidence. This would not be a coincidence if the person 
dropping the plate was on an artillery range! Specifically, the base-rate of loud bangs on an 
artillery range is high. It would not be a coincidence if the person is extremely clumsy and 
routinely shatters plates (for the same reason of a high base-rate of occurrence). It would also 
not be a coincidence if the base-rates of both plate shattering and loud bangs are low, but 
there was an obvious causal mechanism. For instance if the order of events was reversed, i.e., 
if the bang from outside surprises the individual washing the plates and they jump and drop 
the plate shortly thereafter, then this would render the events as causal, rather than 
coincidence. Essentially a low probability pattern has to be observed to repeat corresponding 
to an even lower conjunctive probability that makes chance as an explanation seem 
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implausible but the co-occurrence is even less plausible via a causal mechanism, which leads 
to the judged events as a “coincidence”. 
3. The Psychology of Coincidences, a Review 
Thus far we have discussed the rationalist conceptualisation of coincidences in the 
context of the definitions that previous researchers have proposed. In order to show how far 
this conceptualization departs from the typical approach to understanding coincidences, it is 
important to also review studies of the psychology of coincidences. As mentioned before, the 
common approach to understanding the detection and judgment of coincidences is from the 
view of flawed cognition. We present typical illustrations of the biases that are associated 
with the detection and evaluation of coincidence, and we also review the connections that are 
drawn between experiencing coincidences and the propensity to believe in the paranormal. At 
the end of each section we evaluate the literature with respect to the rationalist 
conceptualisation of coincidences, and highlight some of the limitations in the empirical 
approaches taken.    
3.1 Biases in Cognition  
By focusing on unambiguous low probability events in which the probabilities can be 
specified, researchers have been able to show common errors in the way coincidences are 
interpreted. For instance, Hanley (1984, 1992) discusses a story in the New York Times in 
which a lottery winner received $3.9m in October 1985. The same lottery winner then won 
another lottery, and received $1.5m in February 1986. The likelihood of this occurring was 
estimated in the article as 1 in a trillion. Hanley suggested that this extraordinary estimate is 
based on asking: what is the likelihood of this particular individual winning the lottery twice 
having bought multiple tickets every week for several years and then winning another in 
succession? The right question to ask is: what are the odds of anyone anywhere winning the 
lottery having bought multiple tickets every week for several years and then winning another 
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in succession? Answering this question drops the odds from 1 in a trillion to 1 in a million. 
Hanley (1984) claimed that when people read about low probability events, they make 
erroneous judgments that ignore the probability of the events occurring to anyone while 
focusing on the associated probabilities after the fact that the events occurred to a particular 
individual.  
This type of error has been demonstrated empirically using the Birthday Problem 
(DasGupta, 2005; Matthews & Stone, 1989; Schwarz, 2010). People are told that they are in a 
room full of people at a party, and they need to guess the number of people needed in the 
party for there to be a high probability of at least two individuals sharing the same birthday. 
People typically estimate that large numbers are needed, well over 100, when actually only 
57 are needed for a 0.99 probability. This suggests that people under-appreciate events that 
are likely to happen to anyone within a group of people, and one reason why they might do 
this is because they tend to focus on probability estimates of the particular events occurring, 
rather than the probability of any such event occurring (Burger & Starbird, 2005; Diaconis & 
Mosteller, 1989; Mathews & Stones, 1989). This can be explained through an egocentric bias 
that influences the way people make probability estimates (Falk, 1989; Mathews & Stones, 
1989). It is claimed to work in two ways: first, by elevating their own importance, the 
individual underestimates the likelihood of events in favor of making them seem unique, and 
second, by correspondingly inflating the likelihood of events that are experienced by others 
(Falk, 1989; Falk & MacGregor, 1983; Watt, 1991). In the birthday problem, the individual 
anchors the probability to their own birthdate, emphasizing their uniqueness, which means 
that they inflate the rarity of another member of the party sharing the same birthdate as them. 
In support of this, people have been shown to systematically judge self-experienced 
coincidences as more surprising and less likely than similar coincidences experienced by 
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others (Falk, 1989; Falk & Konold, 1997; Falk & MacGregor, 1983; Miller, Turnbull, & 
McFarland, 1989).  
While the egocentric bias suggests there is a distortion in the probability estimates 
people make, which may increase the value and rarity of the coincidences personally 
experienced, it doesn’t explain why there is a propensity to experience coincidences in the 
first place. To answer this, many have claimed that the fact that people experience 
coincidences tends to reflect an underlying problem with their probabilistic reasoning 
(Hanley, 1984, 1992; Mathews & Stones, 1989; Mock & Weisberg, 1992). Consequently, 
much has been made of the association between people’s ability to solve classic decision 
making tasks and their reported frequency of coincidental experiences (Blagrove, French & 
Jones, 2006; Blackmore, 1997; Blackmore & Trosiancko, 1985; Brugger, Landis & Regard, 
1990; Bressan, 2002; Brugger, Regard, Landis, Krebs, & Niederberger, 1994; Brugger, 
Regard, Landis, & Graves, 1995; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007; Musch & Ehrenberg, 
2002; Watt, 1991). Blackmore (Blackmore, 1984; Blackmore, 1997; Blackmore & 
Trościanko, 1985; Mathews & Blackmore, 1995) has been a strong proponent of the view 
that poor probabilistic reasoning accounts for people’s experience of coincidences.  In fact, in 
support of this, there is evidence of negative correlations between poor performance on 
probabilistic judgment tasks, e.g., base rate neglect, expected value problems, sample size 
problems (See Dagnall, Parker, & Munley, 2007) for illustrations of these tasks) and 
tendencies to hold beliefs in the paranormal. Blackmore claims that poor probabilistic 
reasoning coupled with a misperception of chance events (Blackmore, 1992; Blackmore & 
Troscianko, 1985) in turn gives rise to beliefs in the paranormal which result in a tendency to 
experience coincidences (Blackmore, 1984; Glicksohn, 1990). Crucially, this view implies 
that the interpretation of coincidences is defective but does not imply that the process of 
experiencing the coincidence itself is necessarily defective. However, on the basis of a large 
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survey conducted by Blackmore (1997), the probability misjudgment theories were rejected 
on grounds that believers generated as accurate probability estimates as non-believers.   
A more specific defect that has been associated with increases in the frequency of 
coincidences is the failure to generate random sequences (e.g., avoiding repetitions in coin 
tossing, or incorrectly judging repetitions in sequences as non-random) (Blackmore & 
Troscianko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Brugger, et al, 1990; Brugger et al, 1994; Brugger, et al, 
1995; Dagnall, et al, 2007). Brugger and colleagues (Brugger, et al, 1990; Brugger et al, 
1994; Brugger, et al, 1995) claim that belief in the paranormal, including coincidental 
experiences, is symptomatic of a failure to appreciate properties of random sequences. That 
is, people misinterpret random sequences of events as meaningful and attribute a causal, 
though non-scientific, basis to them, e.g., fate, god, luck, psychic ability.  
3.1.1 Limitations in understanding coincidences from the biased cognition perspective 
The discussion so far has suggested that the detection and interpretation of 
coincidences as meaningful rare events goes hand in hand with a range of cognitive biases 
(Beitmans, 2009; Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989, Falk, 1981-1982; Hintzman, Asher & Stern, 
1978; Watt, 1991). Biases might explain the tendency to misperceive low probability in favor 
of a personal perspective, but they do not explain other aspects of personal coincidental 
experiences, namely, that they aren’t simply low probability events and that they form 
clusters of particular types of experiences (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; Lopes, 1991; Watt, 
1991). An issue for the skeptic perspective is that there is no general framework that so far 
integrates the various demonstrations of biases in perception, judgment, reasoning and 
memory to account for the experience of coincidences. This is the motivation for our attempt 
to offer a potential way of conceptualising coincidences in terms of a stage model that takes 
into account the way in which causality and pattern repetitions inform the detection and then 
evaluation of coincidences. Moreover, the two most common features of the coincidences 
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that have been examined with respect to biases in cognition is that they are judged to be low 
probability events and that the events themselves are repeating patterns (Beitman, 2009; 
Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; Falk, 1989; Falk & Konold, 1997; Falk & MacGregor, 1983; 
Fischoff & Beyth, 1975). By taking a different stance on the way coincidences are 
conceptualised, experimental work can focus on a broader range of phenomena than those 
with unambiguous probabilities typically shown to illustrate biased cognition, e.g., birthdays, 
lotteries, etc. 
One possible broader conception of the role that biases play is that detecting and 
interpreting particular kinds of low probability events serve an adaptive function (Falk, 1981-
1982). The types of biases associated with the detection and interpretation of coincidences, in 
particular egocentrism, generally help to prioritize the effects on the individual’s actions and 
perceptions of new events. This in turn is likely to facilitate the detection of genuine casual 
relations in the world through a mechanism that looks for frequent or complex pattern 
repetitions anchored around an individual’s own actions and behaviors. By default, this 
mechanism will also detect pattern repetitions that invite a causal attribution but in the 
absence of any plausible mechanism, i.e., the occurrence of coincidences is inevitable if real 
causal mechanisms are to be detected. Consistent with the properties that we have based our 
definition on, the many illustrations of coincidental events appear to include: the repetition of 
two or more events/patterns, the improbability of their co-occurrence by chance, and the low 
co-occurrence likelihood in relation to causal hypotheses. 
3.2 Paranormal Beliefs Perspectives 
In the main, people tend to have many experiences of coincidences that are interesting 
but trivial and have little meaning for the individual experiencing them (Bressan, 2002; Falk, 
1989; Watt, 1991). However, there is also a class of coincidences that seem meaningful and 
appear to have happened for a reason (Beitman, 2009; Henry, 1993; Inglis, 1990; Koestler, 
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1973; Tanous & Ardman, 1976). For example, there are a number of cases of religious 
practitioners praying on behalf of family members wishing their ill relative a quick recovery 
and days later the relative recovers, against all medical expectation (Inglis, 1990). There are 
also reported cases of psychics successfully aiding police investigations (Tanous & Ardman, 
1976). Coincidences such as these have helped to maintain beliefs in many different forms of 
the paranormal (e.g., luck, telepathy, precognition, destiny/fate, astrology, divine/diabolic 
intervention), and it is worth noting that the individuals who believe these things do not 
consider these events coincidences. 
The importance of meaningful rare events of the kind just described is that they are 
often used to challenge the dominant scientific, materialist account of reality (Jung, 1972; 
Jung & Pauli, 1955; Kammerer, 1919; Koestler, 1973). Although Kammerer (1919) was 
trained as a biologist, his discoveries of pattern repetitions in nature and his personal 
experience of coincidences led him to propose his concept of seriality (e.g., repeating 
temporal and spatial occurrences of meteorological events such as storms): “The repetition of 
the same or similar things and events in time and space which cannot be linked by a mutual 
causal factor” (1919, p. 36). Kammerer’s Law of Series proposed that events that have 
similar features tend to follow a law of recurrence in which they cluster in time or space 
without an identifiable causal mechanism. Jung’s (1972) Synchronicity principle also 
suggests that coincidences are examples of a larger framework with structured patterns of 
events that are the result of non-physical mechanisms. As theories, the main problem with 
both synchronicity and seriality is that they ignore the possibility that coincidences are a 
psychological phenomenon and focus instead on the premise that coincidences are examples 
of actual but hidden structures in the world.  
Psychological research has reported a strong association between believing in the 
paranormal and experiencing coincidences, particularly the frequency with which they are 
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experienced (Brugger et al., 1990; Coleman, Beitman & Celebi, 2009; Dudley, 2000; Houran 
& Lange, 1996; Glicksohn, 1990; Tobacyk, 1995a, 1995b; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). But 
why might this association exist? Both Kammerer and Jung raise an important point with 
respect to coincidences, which is that as wide ranging as coincidental events are, at their core, 
the key properties that appear to be surprising and important are that they are improbable 
repeating patterns of similar events. Relatedly, Bressan (2002) discussed that observing 
patterns and uncovering the underlying causes of those patterns suggests an adaptive 
mechanism that seeks to explain new phenomena. But, for some, explanations of new 
phenomena that are based in the paranormal simply reflect a lower threshold for making 
causal attributions for rare random events, a point shared by Brugger (1997); this proposal is 
also in line with Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s  (2007) Bayesian belief updating approach to 
understanding coincidences. By lowering the threshold for explaining a new pair of events, 
not only are people more likely to experience coincidences frequently, but they are also 
quicker to attribute paranormal causal explanations for them (Beitman, 2009; Bressan, 2002; 
Whitson, & Galinsky, 2008). But a positive consequence of this low threshold is that these 
individuals are also potentially less likely to miss new but real causal structures than the 
skeptics. Again, as with research on biases in the detection and evaluation of coincidences, 
work on the link between coincidence and the paranormal shows that the core features of 
coincidences are consistent with our definition, which focuses on: the repetition of two or 
more events/patterns, the low likelihood of their co-occurrence by chance, but the even lower 
likelihood of the co-occurrence in relation to causal hypotheses. 
In addition, Blagrove et al. (2006) argued that people with beliefs in the paranormal 
tend to connect unrelated events that appear to be repeating patterns through non-physical 
mechanisms because they connect broad categories of phenomena according to highly 
inclusive sets of explanations, e.g., the supernatural (Blackmore, 1997; Bressan, 2002). If the 
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membership criteria are vague, or if the threshold for explanation is especially low because 
the causal mechanism is underspecified, then this increases susceptibility to detecting patterns 
in meaningless, noisy environments (French & Wilson, 2007; Wiseman & Smith, 2002). 
What this implies is that the frequent detection of coincidences is indicative of the range of 
possible pattern repetitions that the mind is willing/able to observe. In order for the pattern 
matching mechanism to flag a coincidence, an individual must be tuned to various kinds of 
pattern repetitions occurring.  
3.2.1. Paranormal Experiences 
Another common area in which to examine experiences of coincidences is in the 
context of psi phenomena, which are prototypical examples of coincidental experiences 
(Inglis, 1990). Psi phenomena refer to “anomalous processes of information or energy 
transfer such as telepathy or extrasensory perception that are currently unexplained in terms 
of known physical or biological mechanisms” (Bem & Honorton, 1994, p. 4). The most 
common method used to investigate extra-sensory perception (ESP) is the Ganzfeld method 
which involves a participant (the sender) located in one room in which they observe a picture 
or video clip (the target) and attempt to “send” details of the picture to another participant 
(the receiver) who is located in another room and instructed to describe the thoughts entering 
their head. The receiver is then presented with four different pictures/videos, one of which is 
the target, thus setting the possibility of selecting the target by chance alone at 25%. Thus the 
pattern repetition here is the perceived target appearing in the mind of the sender and 
appearing in the mind of the receiver. Bem and Honorton’s (1994) meta-analysis of Ganzfeld 
studies reported above chance detection (35% hit rate) and, therefore, evidence for extra 
sensory perception (ESP). However, Milton and Wiseman’s (1999) meta-analysis of 
Ganzfeld studies, including Bem and Honorton’s study, led them to draw different 
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conclusions. They claimed that the detection rates are at chance levels, and that the 
methodology as yet does not generate reliable results.  
Even if the experimental techniques are sound and there are a sufficient number of 
trials to uncover an ESP effect, some claim there is still a potential error made in the way 
evidence is interpreted (Diaconis & Mosteller, 1989; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007; Mathews 
& Stones, 1989). A potential mistake when making inferences from rare phenomena is 
confusing the probability of the data given the hypothesis, p(d|h), with the probability of the 
hypothesis given the data, p(h|d) (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom & van der Maas, 2011). 
This is problematic scientifically, especially if the phenomena is estimated to be unlikely to 
begin with (e.g., ESP). But, this is also problematic in day-to-day reasoning about the pattern 
repetitions people experience in the world. Crucially, the argument that Wagenmakers et al. 
(2011) make concerning the study of extraordinary phenomena, and which applies to 
personal interpretation of coincidental experiences (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2007), is that the 
prior probability people have of a particular phenomenon, be it psi or any other paranormal 
belief, should moderate the interpretation of the evidence that is used as convincing support 
of it. So from the Griffiths & Tenenbaum (2007) Bayesian perspective on coincidences, while 
current data might plausibly support a paranormal explanation for a given set of events, this 
could reasonably be outweighed when combined with a prior belief against paranormal 
hypotheses (based on prior exposure to a lot of evidence against them).  But even setting 
aside these complicated statistical arguments, the bottom line seems to be that there are as yet 
no psi effects which are robust enough as to be widely replicable by anyone who rigorously 
chooses to do so.   
 
3.2.2 Limitations in understanding coincidences from the paranormal beliefs 
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One potential problem with research uncovering associations between beliefs in the 
paranormal and the frequency of coincidental experiences is that items used in the 
measurement of paranormal beliefs also refer to experiences that are coincidental 
(Blackmore, 1997; Blackmore & Trosiancko, 1985; Bressan, 2002; Henry 1993; Inglis, 
1990). Therefore, finding an association between paranormal beliefs and experiences of 
coincidences may not be all that surprising. Answering the paranormal belief inventory is 
likely to bias/prime people’s recall of the kinds of coincidental experiences people have had 
over their lifetime. Another issue with this research approach is that while the range of 
experiences of coincidences that are examined is broader than those which researchers on 
biased cognition focus on, the key problem is the same. The focus of the type of coincidences 
is still narrow, and only concerns those that have a potential paranormal explanation.  
This leads to a more fundamental point which concerns the two basic views of 
coincidences, believers versus skeptics, that we described at the start, which is that 
“coincidence” is relative to a particular perspective. If an individual were to explain a pair of 
events as an example of psychic phenomenon (e.g., dreaming about a plane crashing and 
avoiding taking a flight which crashes) then for that individual a causal attribution is made 
and the events constitute an example of a paranormal experience, not in fact an example of a 
coincidence. Therefore, this presents a point of contention because a skeptic would class the 
same events as coincidental, because a paranormal based explanation for the events is just not 
a scientifically plausible causal explanation, and that changes the status of events from to 
causal to coincidental, for them. 
The key point is that neither perspective places much emphasis on what coincidences 
indicate about the mind’s mechanisms for causal induction. In attempting to understand the 
psychological processes that underpin the detection and evaluation of coincidences, an 
alternative conceptualization is needed in order to avoid the problems of emphasis arising 
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from the believer versus skeptic perspective. For this reason, the rationalist conceptualization 
that we propose considers the mechanisms that enable the detection of low probability pattern 
repetitions, and the processes that make a judgment of cause or coincidence. 
4 Theoretical Perspectives on Coincidences 
In this final section we present a psychological framework for coincidences (the 3 C’s 
Framework for Coincidences) which follows directly from the definition and perspective we 
developed above. Specifically, it focuses on the detection and evaluation of coincidences in 
the context of causal induction mechanisms. Here too, we situate our proposals within 
previous frameworks that concern phenomena related to coincidences.  
4.1 The 3 C’s Framework for Coincidences 
Implied in our definition is the view that coincidence and causality are flip sides of 
the same co-variance detection coin and are thus implicated in causal induction mechanisms 
as suggested, in part, by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007). We propose that the experience of 
coincidences is an unavoidable part of a rational inductive reasoning process that involves 
three stages, with the last two stages potentially cycling, as summarized in Figure 1. Hence, 
our 3 C’s Framework of Coincidences: Stage 1 Co-incidence detection, Stage 2 Causality 
search, Stage 3 Coincidence versus Causality evaluation.  
Stage 1) detection of a surprising pattern repetition, a Co-incidence (pronounced co-
inCIDence as in to coincide) that seems unlikely by chance alone or an obvious causal 
mechanism, Stage 2) Causality search for possible explanations of the detected co-incidence, 
Stage 3) Coincidence versus Cause evaluation; if the probability of some causal explanation 
is now high, in particular relative to the probability due to chance, then surprise is eliminated 
and the co-incidence is evaluated as Cause. On the other hand, if no plausible causal 
explanations are generated (i.e., the combined probability of all causal explanations is low), 
then either the search for plausible causal mechanisms continues in an attempt to reduce the 
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surprisingness of the co-incidence (Stage 2 repeats), or Stage 3 terminates with a judgment of 
Coincidence (pronounced in the standard way coINcidence) given the lack of a plausible 
causal mechanism. However, surprise remains relatively high because further evaluation has 
still left the apparent probability of the events due to chance as fairly low even though the 
coincidence judgment has nonetheless ascribed them to chance given that cause is even less 
plausible. So, in line with the definition we propose, coincidences are surprising pattern 
repetitions that are observed to be unlikely by chance but are nonetheless ascribed to chance 
since the search for causal mechanisms has not generated any plausible ones. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
         
 
               
            
     
 
 
Stage 1: Co-incidence Detection Stage 2: Causality Search Stage 3: Coincidence or Cause?  
 
Figure 1. The 3 C’s Framework for Coincidences 
 
 
 
Our proposal has aspects in common with Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s (2007) 
Bayesian framework of causal induction, though some differences as well. Coincidences are 
pattern repetitions (“anomalies”) that are reasonably low-probability due to chance and 
invoke a search for causal explanation. Here we refer to anomalies as (Kittler et al., 2014): A 
situation in which an observer is faced with a new experience, in which some or all of the 
 Is the detected 
surprising pattern 
unlikely by chance in 
the context of 
temporal/ spatial/ 
similarity proximity? 
 
Are there any causal 
explanations for this 
pattern?  
 
Is the probability of the 
evaluated causal  
mechanism(s) sufficiently high 
to be plausible? If so, then  
conclude “cause”, if not, then 
conclude “coincidence”  
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current models that the observer has, initially fail to accommodate. The evaluation of the 
evidence for possible causal mechanisms is considered in relation to chance, thus arriving at 
causality versus coincidence judgment. A potential difference is that we are proposing 
multiple stages of processing in terms of an initial detection stage and a cycling search stage 
and a coincidence versus cause judgment stage rather than simply a final judgment. 
Further, to be able to specify a formal Bayesian framework, Griffiths and Tenenbaum 
(2007) used experiments in which it was possible to precisely articulate alternative 
hypotheses (so as to be able to specify prior belief probabilities for them as well as calculate 
unambiguous probabilities of the observed events given each hypothesis respectively). One 
question that is raised from this perspective is whether a completely specified set of 
alternative hypotheses are required when evaluating pattern repetitions? 
Our answer to this question is not necessarily. In fact, what is often overlooked in 
research concerning inferences about coincidences is the frequent lack of any clearly 
articulable causal explanation, however implausible. Most people don’t necessarily or 
immediately posit a paranormal explanation when chance doesn’t seem to be a sufficient 
explanation for a combination of rare similar events (Bressan, 2002; Blagrove et al, 2006; 
Inglis, 1990; Koestler, 1973; Watt, 1991). And they don’t necessarily treat coincidences as 
meaningful simply because they correspond to an obvious but implausible paranormal 
explanation, but may rather accept that there simply is no casual explanation (Bressan, 2002; 
Blagrove et al., 2006; Inglis, 1990). In classification systems of coincidences that have been 
developed, there are categories which include coincidental experiences that people have 
reported which are simply repetitious events that are rare and that aren’t associated with the 
paranormal (e.g., Henry’s (1993) spontaneous perception in time and spontaneous perception 
in space). Moreover, people can accurately judge coincidences as chance events, but that 
doesn’t prevent them from detecting these events as coincidences in the first place or from 
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trying to generate causal explanations for them (Bressan, 2002; Falk, 1989; Falk & Konold, 
1997; Falk & MacGregor, 1983). For instance, take the famous coincidence of the similarities 
between John F. Kennedy and Abraham Lincoln: They were elected to congress in similar 
years (1946, 1846 respectively), and then elected as presidents 100 years apart (1960, 1860 
respectively), their assassins were born 100 years apart, and their Presidential successors 
were born 100 years apart, etc. The many listed components of this rare pattern repetition 
invite a causal explanation, but most accept that this is just a fairly remarkable list of rare but 
chance pattern repetitions sampled also from the many attributes that they might have shared 
but didn’t. Importantly, this coincidence doesn’t necessarily arise from a conflict between a 
single, obvious causal account and chance. It may simply be that an abstract sense of 
causality conflicts with chance when incredible coincidences occur such as the one described 
above. For example, suppose that the Lincoln-Kennedy similarities included both losing the 
middle fingers of their left hands from the second joint in hunting accidents when seven years 
old, both having failed novelist uncles named Ebenezer who worked as baker’s assistants, 
both born on the same day of the year, both born to fathers who were decorated army 
sergeants, both struck by lightning at 16, etc. At some point even though the exact probability 
of these repeating patterns cannot be unambiguously specified, it becomes so obviously small 
as to demand a causal explanation, we return to this point in the final section of this 
discussion.  
In sum, prior research suggests that when people consider their own personal 
experiences of coincidences they don’t always have a precise specification of alternative 
hypotheses. So, it is not clear that these are required. In other words, there need not be a 
precisely specified, possibly parapsychological explanation with a clearly low prior 
probability for the judgment of coincidence. It may be sufficient to articulate, that unable to 
think of any plausible alternatives, the overall probability of any causal mechanism is low, 
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without necessarily specifying them all or being able to individually specify their 
probabilities. In the section that follows, we now describe the psychological processes 
embodied in the stages of our model in the detection and evaluation of coincidental 
experiences. 
4.1.1 Stage 1 Co-incidence detection  
We argue that a critical feature of coincidences is that they are surprising low 
probability pattern repetitions without immediately obvious causal explanations. Pattern 
detection mechanisms are alerted to many new experiences of low probability events and are 
closely tied to mechanisms for learning and novelty detection. Exactly which patterns are 
detectable is tied to the richness of the conceptual apparatus of the detector. But in short a 
pattern is anything that results in “There’s that thing. Oh! There it is again!” Novelty is 
simply an event that is judged to be unexpected within the context of the situation in which it 
arises. Pattern detection mechanisms are known to be sensitive to novelty in two basic 
ways—contrast and change, which has long been established in visual processing (Mareschal, 
& Johnson, 2002; Marr, 1982). In other words, the salient novel event is notable because it 
pops out from the background of highly probable events experienced within a given context. 
For instance, a man wearing a green outfit and an oversized green hat would contrast quite 
highly with the other customers of a London pub on any other day other than Saint Patrick’s 
day given that the probability is generally very low that people wear green outfits and also 
frequent London pubs.   
Once experienced, a novel event’s representation is stored according to several 
associated features that include temporal, spatial aspects, and the 
perceptual/contextual/semantic features. This contrasts with the Kinds view proposed by 
researchers such as Falk (1989), which suggest that rather than decomposing the details, 
people have a configural representation that enables the observed events to be assigned to a 
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general category of ‘unlikely kinds’. In other words, the Kinds view assumes that people do 
not abstract specific temporal or spatial properties from the events they judge to be 
coincidental, they simply represent the whole event as coincidental. Returning to our green 
suit example, now imagine that you see the green suited man with an oversized green hat in 
pub X in London on Monday, and again in pub Y in London the following week on Monday. 
In this example the representation would be green suited men in pubs, rather than the specific 
temporal (e.g. I’ve seen the same man on two different Mondays), spatial (e.g. I’ve seen the 
same man in two different pubs in London), and semantic features (e.g. I’ve seen the same 
man wearing exactly the same odd clothes in two different places and it isn’t Saint Patrick’s 
day yet). As discussed by Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2007), there are various limitations with 
the Kinds position, because it is unclear how a kind should be specified, and the same events 
can be re-described in various different ways to appeal to different unlikely kinds.   
We propose that for the novel experience to constitute a coincidence, the key 
properties of the novel event must be that they are rare, they repeat and there is not a 
compelling causal explanation and as such is surprising. For instance buying a round of 
drinks in which the total cost is £11.11 might appear somewhat rare because it is an odd total 
cost because the 1 repeats. However, when going to pay for the round, you notice that the 
amount of money in your wallet exactly matches the amount due down to the penny, £11.11. 
Once the representation of the novel event is triggered again (i.e. when you go to pay the 
number 1111 re-presents itself to you), this activates the search for causal mechanisms (e.g., 
what’s the connection between the cost of the round which contains a repeating pattern, and 
the repeating pattern presenting itself in the exact change that I have?). The judged 
coincidentality is based on the conjunctive probability that the novel pattern initially detected 
repeats (e.g., the numeral 1 occurs repeatedly in the cost of the round and in the exact change 
available) but is not explained by a habitually expected causal mechanism like the lights 
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coming on after flipping the switch. This, along with spatio-temporal proximity of the events, 
is the trigger for a search for possible causal explanations.   
4.1.2 Stages 2 and 3: Search for possible causal explanations ↔ causality vs. coincidence 
decision 
When a coincidence seems improbable due to chance or an obvious causal 
mechanism, a memory search for causal explanations gets initiated. Memory searches are 
assumed to continue if no plausible hypotheses have currently been retrieved, or if the 
plausibility of the hypotheses already retrieved from memory is lower than chance (Gettys & 
Fisher, 1979). More specifically, we refer to a recent model proposed by Dougherty, Thomas 
and Lange (2010) that connects hypothesis testing to hypothesis generation and memory 
retrieval. Once a set of features initiates a search in memory for candidate hypotheses, the set 
of hypotheses that could be considered may end up being intractable. The HyGene 
(Hypothesis Generation) model tackles this problem by suggesting that the range of 
hypotheses generated is constrained by the available data that the individual is considering at 
the time (Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008). By thinking about the semantic, 
perceptual and contextual features of the pattern repetition, this acts as a retrieval cue for 
hypotheses from semantic and associative memory (Dougherty et al, 2010).  
The sub-set of hypotheses that are then generated is in fact the space of possibilities 
which become the focus of consideration. The total possible number of hypotheses that are 
under consideration at any one time is constrained by working memory (Dougherty et al, 
2010). The consideration of the hypotheses is based on an evaluative process which occurs in 
stage 3, and involves a comparison of the probability of the hypotheses against chance 
(similar to the Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2007, Bayesian framework). We propose that the 
search in memory for a candidate hypothesis to account for the pattern repetition is highly 
recursive. In other words, the search may eventually generate a potential hypothesis, once it 
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is evaluated in stage 3 it may eventually be rejected, and so the search for another hypothesis 
from memory will be generated. If the overall sense of causal improbability is still low, the 
search may continue and/or new data (i.e., new features of the coincidence) may be elicited 
and used in further searches.  
If we return to the round-of-drinks example, the improbability of the cost of the round 
of drinks having both a repeating numeral (e.g. £11.11) and exactly matching the available 
change is obvious, that sort of thing doesn’t normally happen by some habitualized causal 
mechanism (stage 1), so triggers a search for causal explanations (stage 2) based on the 
surprise generated in stage 1. Such explanations might include the possibility that the cost of 
drinks somehow conformed to the available money, for example, the cost might actually have 
been £11.50, but then the bar tender said they’d just take the available change because they 
were in a good mood. If a plausible causal mechanism is found then surprise is eliminated at 
stage 3 which would terminate with the judgment “Cause.”  If not, ongoing surprise can 
result in continuing the stage 2 search for causal mechanisms and further stage 3 cause versus 
chance evaluations until one wins, either because a plausible mechanism is found or because 
the probability by chance is small but not too small to be an unacceptable explanation. 
However, if eventually stage 2 is exhausted in terms of not producing more candidate 
mechanisms, then at stage 3 a decision based on the available evidence is invoked. So the 
stage 3 output is either “Coincidence” if the probability of the chance explanation isn’t too 
small or “Coincidence?!” and an implied unknown causal mechanism if the probability of the 
chance explanation is still unacceptably small.  
4.2 A real world example of the 3 C’s Framework of Coincidences 
A famous criminal case that illustrates these 3 stages is that of Nurse Lucia B. The 
reason we have chosen this example is that it is a relatively high profile real world example 
of a seemingly rare pattern. It is an example of events that do not have easily specifiable 
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probabilities, and which do not lend themselves to a paranormal explanation. More 
importantly, the example demonstrates the cognitive processes that would have likely been 
involved when identifying and evaluating the pattern repetition. Finally, it also illustrates that 
this kind of induction process has consequences in the real world. As mentioned by others 
(Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2007), the processes implicated in the evaluation of cause and 
coincidence had led to major discoveries, but also to serious errors in judgment.   
In 2003, Nurse Lucia B was convicted of seven murders (poisoning) and three 
attempted murders of patients in three different hospitals. Nurses working in the most recent 
employment of Lucia became suspicious when 9 patients needed resuscitation and died on 
her shifts (stage 1, coincidence detection, leading to stage 2, search for causal explanations). 
Authorities initially estimated the odds of this many resuscitations occurring on the same 
nurse’s shift at 1 in 7 billion, an estimate which was later reduced to 1 in 342 million, still 
extremely low.  
Given the estimate, the criminal investigation began, based on the assumption that the 
odds were so low that the events were due to chance that they had to have a causal basis 
(stage 3, cause chosen over coincidence). The search for an explanation clearly stopped 
because a highly plausible causal explanation was found. However, the conviction was later 
overturned with the uncovering of new evidence, and statistical analyses revealed that the 
odds of the same nurse being present at 9 resuscitations in 3 hospitals were actually as high as 
1 in 44. The events were indeed found to be coincidental, and Nurse Lucia was exonerated in 
2010 (stage 2, new information downgraded the causal evidence, so stage 3 resulted in a 
decision of coincidence over cause).  
A very similar case to Nurse B which is still currently being investigated involves a 
nurse in Scotland that was convicted in 2008 of murdering 4 elderly patients. The controversy 
here, just as with Nurse B, is whether in fact the death of the four patients is a coincidence, 
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rather than the result of murder (BBC, 2014). There are many legal cases in which there have 
been miscarriages of justice because the initial estimates of the events occurring by chance 
(e.g., finding traces of evidence on the victim and the suspect) are considered too low for that 
to be a plausible explanation but then go on to be reversed because the plausibility of chance 
gets re-evaluated. Typically, the coincidences that people experience are not of this extreme 
low probability, or as consequential, and typically, in most day to day coincidental 
experiences the search for causal explanations not likely to be exhaustive because the events 
aren’t considered important. 
5. The 3 C’s Framework of Coincidences and Key findings from Prior Research on 
Coincidences 
Our review of the literature on coincidences (above) indicates that there are three key 
findings:  
1. Biased judgments. Peoples’ evaluation of coincidences has been shown to be 
influenced by a variety of judgment biases, especially in terms of probability 
estimation, and notably the egocentric bias in which people tend to give higher 
estimates of rarity and surprise to personally experienced coincidences as compared to 
those experienced by others. 
2. Paranormal beliefs. There is an association between beliefs in the paranormal and the 
frequency with which coincidences are experienced. 
3. Individual differences in educational background, IQ, gender, and occupation are not 
reliable predictors of the frequency with which coincidences are experienced.  
We consider each of these in relation to the proposed 3C’s framework. 
 Our purpose is not to dismiss the research on biases in general and probability 
judgments in particular as wrong or unimportant. Indeed, the 3C’s framework predicts 
outcome judgment biases will occur to the extent that the various component probability 
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judgments are biased. So for example if the egocentric bias is fundamentally the result of 
biased probability judgment then that is not specifically a problem for the framework. Also to 
the extent that this framework overlaps with the Griffith’s and Tenenbaum’s  (2007) 
Bayesian framework then it can predict that even accurate probability judgments about the 
immediate events can lead to paranormal conclusions in the presence of prior paranormal 
beliefs. So associations between coincidence occurrence and paranormal beliefs as a result of 
biased probabilities also don’t seem particularly problematic. Crucially, what is important to 
highlight is that the 3C’s framework can predict these key effects as a result of the processing 
stages, separate from or potentially even without biases being present in the input 
probabilities.  
5. 1 Egocentric Bias 
 Consider the application of the 3 C’s processing framework to two comparable 
coincidences one of which is mine and one of which is yours. If the events weren’t surprising 
in terms of a high initial probability by chance and/or an obvious causal mechanism, then 
both of us wouldn’t make it beyond stage 1 and it is very unlikely either of us would even 
think a coincidence had occurred. However to the extent that the events are surprising, in 
terms of a low apparent probability by chance and no habitually applicable causal 
mechanism, they both initiate stage 2, the search for plausible causal mechanisms. If either of 
us finds one, then stage 3 terminates “Cause”.  However if we’ve both exhausted stage 2 and 
haven’t found any plausible causal mechanisms then the events survives in our own minds as 
“Coincidence!” So at any given moment in time such a coincidence has survived a fairly 
extensive and maybe even exhaustive search process thus making it quite surprising. Also we 
both may be inclined to tell other people “This surprising thing happened....” so in turn we’re 
also both likely to hear about other peoples’ “surprising coincidences” as well. But an 
apparent egocentric bias can occur between my own and other peoples’ i.e. your coincidences 
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because my coincidence has survived and maybe even exhausted stage 2 and is still pretty 
surprising at the end of stage 3. But while your coincidence may still be surprising to you at 
the end of stage 3, I haven’t even completed stage 2 for it yet; i.e. I’m still searching.  Further 
there’s a substantial chance that my different causal search space results in at least a semi-
plausible mechanism for your coincidence that you’ve missed. In essence, two minds are 
better than one. So now my coincidence is more surprising that yours as mine has survived a 
selection process in terms of my search and that of the other people I’ve told and is still a 
“surprising coincidence” while at the same time my additional search for yours may 
downgrade it to being just a “somewhat surprising coincidence” or at best leave it the same. 
In short, the search and selection process through these stages can produce an apparent 
egocentric bias even if the component input probabilities are unbiased. A paradoxical 
prediction from this search selection process is that forced termination of causal search early 
before it is exhausted should result in higher judged probability of some as yet unspecified 
causal mechanism compared to a search which is allowed to run its full course.  
 Another potential reason for the egocentric bias is related to the meaningfulness of the 
coincidence for the protagonist who experienced it. In terms of the 3C’s framework, 
meaningfulness is closely tied to the importance of personally relevant causal mechanisms 
especially in terms of usefulness. All else being equal, it is generally more important for me 
to detect potential causes impinging on me than those you report as impinging on you. So to 
the extent that surprise is adaptive, my coincidences should be both more surprising and more 
meaningful to me than yours, even if my assessment of the relevant probabilities for both is 
unbiased.     
5.2 Beliefs in the paranormal 
The message concerning the association between poor probabilistic reasoning and 
frequency of experiencing coincidences is not clearly established, but there does appear to be 
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convergence in the literature on the association between beliefs in the paranormal and 
frequency of experiencing coincidences.  Our framework would account for this effect in the 
similar way as with egocentric bias, which is the impact of beliefs is likely to influence stages 
2 and 3 of the 3 C’s framework. It’s important to emphasize that there are two perspectives in 
this context, that of the person who experienced the coincidence and that of the researcher 
studying coincidences. From the perspective of the person experiencing the coincidence, 
belief in the paranormal means that stage 2 produces a reasonably plausible causal 
mechanism quickly and stage 3 terminates with the judgment “paranormal CAUSE!”. Such 
an individual sees paranormal causation everywhere and consequently may miss more 
mundane normal causes when they’re actually occurring. However, from the perspective of 
the researcher who doesn’t believe in the paranormal, the person has actually experienced and 
is thus reporting a “coincidence.” But if the individual doesn’t believe in the paranormal, then 
they are more likely to do a protracted stage 2 search for a normal causal mechanism. And 
because they’re searching longer and harder, they’re more likely to find one and terminate 
stage 3 by deciding “Cause” and not report the events as a coincidence at all. So again a 
selection process operating while moving through these three stages can explain the 
correlation between paranormal beliefs and the number of coincidences experienced separate 
from whether the component input probabilities are biased or not. A test of this hypothesis 
would involve believers and non-believers (in the paranormal) taking part in a diary study in 
which they keep a record of their coincidental experiences, estimates of their likelihood, and 
descriptions of possible explanations for each of them. We would predict that there would be 
fewer causal explanations and higher estimates of the rarity of the coincidences experienced 
for those that believe in the paranormal as compared to non-believers.  
5.3 Individual Differences 
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Large scale surveys examining individual differences tend to suggest that the 
frequency of experiencing coincidences is not predicted by IQ, age, gender, occupation, and 
educational background. At least greater age, IQ and education background would all seem 
likely to correspond to a richer conceptual apparatus and a greater potential to detect 
surprising co-incidences in stage 1. However this is potentially offset by correspondingly rich 
causal search spaces, so there is a greater chance of finding at least semi-plausible causal 
mechanisms in stage 2 and thus resulting in less surprising and ultimately fewer 
“coincidences”. However, this is likely, in turn, to be partly offset in the sense that the fewer 
events which survive this harsher selection process are likely to be more surprising. So 
overall search and selection results in offsetting tendencies in terms of coincidence 
occurrence but in the context of the prediction that the conceptual spaces of older, those that 
are better educated and also have higher IQ’s should result in fewer but more surprising 
coincidences. 
6. A final thought: Coincidences and the problem of induction  
We have argued that coincidence and causality are different sides of the same 
covariance detection coin, and for this reason we have proposed that coincidences provide an 
extremely useful alternative perspective on the mechanisms of causal induction. Studying 
coincidences is crucial, not only because they give a new perspective on the pattern 
repetitions the mind is prepared to detect in the first place but also because they correspond to 
an assessment of limitations in using past events to predict future events, because no 
plausible causal explanation has been found. That is, concepts which correspond to potential 
causal knowledge of the world and can provide inductive justification for thinking that a 
pattern will repeat in the future are called projectable (i.e. they allow the mind to reasonably 
project the past into the future) while concepts that don’t are nonprojectable (Goodman, 
1955). If coincidences are pattern repetitions ascribed to chance and not to underlying causal 
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structure then, we argue, coincidences can be usefully viewed as nonprojectable concepts and 
vice versa. While this conceptualization does not solve the philosophical problem of 
induction, examining coincidences gives a unique perspective both on the philosophical 
problem and on how the mind practically deals with causal induction.  
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